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This paper-  a product  of the Office  of the Vice  President,  Development  Economics -is  one in a series
of background  papers  prepared  forthe WorldDevelopmentReport  1992. The  Report,  on development  and
the environment,  discusses  the possible  effects  of the  expected  dramatic  growth  in the world's  population,
industrial  output,  use of energy,  and demand  for food.  Copies  of this and other  World  Development  Report
background  papers are available  free from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.
Please  contact  the WorldDevelopment  Report  Office,  room T7-101,extension  31393 (October  1992,  31
pages).
Larsen  and Shah present  evidence  on the level  of  consumption.  Net fossil fuel importers  in Japan,
fossil fuel subsidies  and their implications  for  the United States,  and Western  Europe  are
carbon  dioxide emissions.  They conclude  that  estimated  to experience  welfare  gains of about
substantial  fossil fuel subsidies  prevail in a  US$14 billion,  while welfare  effects would  be
handful  of large, carbon-emitting  countries.  negative  in exporting  countries  in the event of a
Removing  such  subsidies  could  substantially  dampening  effect on world fossil  fuel prices
reduce  national  carbon  emissions  in some  coun-  associated  with the removal  of subsidies.
tries.  Global  carbon  emissions  could  be reduced  by
9 percent,  assuming  no change  in world  fossil  fuel  Eliminating  these subsidies  would  translatte
prices,  and by 5 percent  when  accounting  for  into an average  21 percent  reduction  in carbon
estimated  changes  in wodd  pinces.  emissions  in the subsidizing  countries,  or 20
percent  of OECI)  emissions.  To achieve  an
Larsen  and Shah estimate  world  energy  equivalent  reduction  in tons of emissions  in the
subsidies  to be more than US$230  billion.  The  OECD  countries  would  require  imposing  a
welfare  costs of these subsidies  are more than  carbon  tax of $604$70  per ton of carbon,  even
US$20  billion, not including  the cost of green-  when accounting  for estimated  changes  in world
house  gas and local pollution  from fossil fuel  fossil fuel prices.
The  Policy  Research  Working  PapSeriesdisseminates thefindings  of work  under  way  in theBank.  Anobjectiveof  the  series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papvrs  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemnination  CenterWORLD FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES  AND GLOBAL  CARBON  EMISSIONS
Bjorn Larsen and Anwar Shah'
'Public  Economics Division, The World Bank, Room N10-053, Washington,  D.C. 20433.  The
authors are grateful to Messrs Lawrence H. Summers and Andrew Steer for guidance, comments and
support, and to David Pearce, Jim Poterba, and Dennis Anderson  for additional  comments.The World Development Report 1992, "Development and the Environment," discusses the
possible  effects of the expected dramatic  growth in the world's population,  industrial  output, use
of  energy, and demand for food.  Under current practices, the result could be appalling
environmental conditions in  both urban and rural areas.  The World Development Report
presents an alternative, albeit more difficult, path - one that, if taken, would allow future
generations to  witness improved environmental conditions a.-.ompanied by  rapid economic
development  and the virtual eradication  of widespread  poverty.  Choosing  this path will require
that both industrial and developing  countries seize the current moment  of opportunity  to reform
policies, institutions, and aid programs.  A two-fold strategy is required.
* First, take advantage  of the positive  links between  economic  efficiency, income  growth,
and protection of the environment. This calls for accelerating programs for reducing poverty,
removing  distortions that encourage  the economically  inefficient  and environmentally  damaging
use of naturai resources, clarifying  property rights, expanding  programs for education  (especially
for girls), family  planning  services, sanitation  and clean  water, and agricultural  extension, credit
and research.
* Second, break the negative links between economic activity and the environment.
Certain targeted measures, described in  the  Report, can bring dramatic improvements in
environmental  quality  at modest  cost in investment  and economic  efficiency. To implement  them
will require overcoming the power of vested interests, building stroiig institutions, improving
knowledge,  encouraging  participatory  decisionmaking,  and building  a partnership  of cooperation
between industrial and developing  countries.
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I. Iptroductionx
It has been argued that economic  policies to protect local and global environments  should, first
and foremost, remove fossil fuel subsidies  (see Summers, 1991, Churchill and Saunders, 1991, Larsen
and Shah, 1992a, 1992b  and Shah  and Larsen, 1992a, 1992b).  Unfortunately,  the available  literature  does
not document  in any meaningful  detail the level of worldwide  subsidies  on fossil fuels, the impact  of *heir
removal  on world energy markets,  global carbon  emissions  and aggregate  welfare in subsidizing  and non-
subsidizing  countries. 2 This paper attempts  to correct these deficiencies.
Section  n reviews existing fossil fuel pricing regimes  and estimates  the level of world fossil fuel
subsidies.  Section III develops a simple framework for estimating the impact of subsidy removal on
global carbon emissions. A first estimate  of carbon emission  reductions  is based on the assumption  that
world prices of fossil fuels do not change in response  to the demand reduction in subsidizing  countries
that results from the removal of subsidies. Subsequently,  world price effects  and fossil fuel consumption
in non-subsidizing  countries are estimated  using a simple model of global fossil f .el markets.  Section
IV estimates  welfare gains that result from fossil  fuel subsidy  removal:  first, on the assumption  that world
prices are unchanged  for both subsidizing  and non-subsidizing  countries;  second, on the assumption  that
such prices do change.  Section V estimates what level of OECD carbon taxes would be required to
achieve  world emission  reductions equal to those resulting from the removal of subsidies.  Section VI
presents a sunimary  and conclusions.
11.  Existing fossil fuel pricing regimes and world subsidies
Correct fossil fuel prices are a prima facie first order priority in any economic  policy to curtail
greenhouse  gas emissions. This section explores  the potential  for correct fossil fuel prices by analyzing
pricing practices  around the world.  Although  a complete  inventory  of worldwide  fossil fuel subsidies  is
beyond the scope of this study, it is possible to obtain a reasonable estimate of the overall level of
subsidies by studying only a small set of countries.  For example, 90% of world coal production is
2 A number of recent studies have reflected upon various aspects of this question: Kosmo (1989)
estimates the level of subsidies for a  large sample of developing countries primarily for petroleum
products and electricity; Sterner (1989) presents a time series of domestic petroleum product prices
relative to world prices for Latin American countries; and Burgess (1990) evaluates  potential carbon
dioxide  emission  reductions  from efficient  electricity  pricing in a sample  of countries  including  the United
States, China and India.consumed  by 15 countries; 80% of world petroleum  products by 28 countries; and 91  % of world natural
gas output by 20 countries (see Table 1). These countries are collectively  responsible  for 8'%  of fossil
fuel carbon  emissions. Roughly  one half of coal and natural gas consumers,  and one fourth of petroleum
product consumers, are OECD countries  with relatively insignificant  subsidies.
We define fossil fuel subsidies as te  difference  between domestic fossil fuel prices and their
opportunity  cost evaluated  at end-user prices. When fuels are traded internationally,  border prices serve
as opportunity  cost: this is the case for petroleum  products for all sample countries.  Opportunity  costs
at end-user level are border prices plus a mark-up for distribution.  U.S. pre-tax end-user prices of
petroleum  products by sector are used as proxies for opportunity  cost at end-user level, although unit
distribution costs may vary across countries to some extent.  Natural gas and coal are traded less
frequwiitly  than oil/petroleum products and natural gas markets are primarily regional in character.
Border prices plus distribution costs are used if these fuels are imported  or if there are export markets -
as for the former Soviet Union in the case  of natural gas, and to a lesser extent coal. Long run marginal
costs are used for coal in the cases of China and India and for natural gas in Argentina?  For purposes
of convenience,  opportunity  cost is henceforth  referred to as world price. Exchange  rates reported in the
IMF's International  Financial  Statistics have been used to convert domestic currency figures to dollars.
Thus, total subsidies  Sk for country k are given as:
Sk = Ei Ej (p ,j-p0e)qij  (1)
where p, is domestic end-user  price of fossil fuel i in sector j, pw.j  is opportunity  cost of fuel i in sector
j in US dollars, e is the exchange  rate in units of US dollars to domestic  currency, and u%  is domestic
consumption of fuel i  in sector j.4  According  to  (1), total subs-dies are the product of the price
differential  and quantity consumed  at subsidized  prices. Since  the efficiency  cost of subsidies  is defined
as the difference  between  total subsidies  and the increase in consumer  surplus, there is no need to apply
price elasticities  of demand in order to calculate  subsidies. If total subsidies  were calculated  on the basis
3 Although  it is possible that China could  perhaps increase  exports to South Korea, Hong Kong and
Japan.
4  Sectors include electricity generation, industry, transport, households and a  residual sector.
Subsidies  on outputs or complementary  inputs to energy in any of these sectors would act as "implicit"
subsidies on energy because  more energy would be used than at efficient input and output prices.  We
do not attempt to account for such inefficiencies.
2Table 1.  Carbon Emissions from Fassil Fuel Combustion
Cabon emiuion fram  petnAlum  product' (1917)  Carbon  enussios from  coal  (1987)  Catbon  emasion  from  naur  pas  (1987)
000  % of world  *  wmlaivo  000  5 of wod  cumulative  000  %  of  cunuaie
o1u  emDisi  o  MI  IO  S
United  Stes  545300  23.81%  23.S1%  China  47900  20.71X  20.71%  USSR  302400  34.0S%  34.05%
USSR  339200  14.81%  38162%  Unied9  st  465800  20.14%  40.85%  Uniwedsate  235000  26.46%  60.52%
1aa  139400  6.09%  44.71%  USSR  371300  16.05%  56.90%  Unied  ngdom  31000  3.49%  64.01%
aii"  U3600  3.65%  48.36%  Polad  IO600  4.70%  61.60%  CMda  29600  3.33%  67.34%
Genmny.Weat  73200  3.20%  51.56%  india  1OSSO0  4.69%  66.29%  Genamy.  Wea  25600  2.88%  70.23S
Ialy  63000  2.75%  5431%  Gemany, Wed  71S00  3.39%  69.68%  J  2S200  253%  72.75%
Mexico  57900  2.53%  56.84%  Japan  75200  3.2S%  72.93%  Rania  22000  2.48S  75.24%
Frnce  56000  2.45%  5928S  Gemray, Eau  72300  3.13%  76.06%  Neestanda  21000  236%  77.60%
Canada  52400  2.29%  61.57%  Unid  Kingdom  71000  3.07%  79.13%  s1y  19000  2.14%  79.74*
UnitedKngda.  52000  2.27%  63.84S  SuthfMica  66600  2.S  2.01%  France  14000  15%  81.32%
Brzil  313O  1.67%  65.51%  Ccboldovskis  46200  2.00  84.00S  Mexico  1600  153%  12.SS%
nil  33700  1.47%  66.9S%  NNor  Koa  36423  1.57%  85.58%  Sai  Anbia  1200  135%  84.20%
Saudi  Aabia  32000  1.40%  6138%  Aatai  35100  1.52%  87.10%  Venehsta  10731  1.21%  SSAIS
ran  26000  1.14%  69.52%  Canada  7100  1.175  88.27%  Argent  lo100  1.13%  M654%
Spain  250O0  1.09%  70.61%  Souds  Koea  23700  1.02%  929%  AMgmi  9000  l.OX  47.55S
Auakia  20800  0.91%  71.52%  ken  400  0.95%  8.49%
Indoneia  20586  0.90%  72.42%  Wodd  2313000  Angralls  7900  t  .89%  8938S
SOU&hoA  20000  0.87%  73.29%  Canm  7300  0.82%  90.21%
Argetn  17000  0.74%  74.03%  Unitd Aab Enir.  7100  O.OS  91.01%
Tuke  16000  0.70%  74.73%
Egypt,  A*b Rep.  15966  0.70S  75.43%
Ronmai  13OW  0.57%  76.00%
BDegium  13000  0.57%  76.56%
GeMan.  Eat  12800  0.56%  77.12%
Czeboaos  12600  0.55%  77.67S
Venezea  12473  0.54%  78.22%
Blgaia  12000  0.52%  7t.74%
Pdlnd  11600  051%  79.25%
Wodd  2290000
Suc:  Wod ResOu  Inatitut(1991)of consumption  at non-subsidized  prices, they would be less than the increase in consumer  surplus, and
welfare would therefore be higher with a subsidy.
Total subsidies by fuel and country are presented in Table 2, and ratios of domestic prices to
world prices in Chart I and the appendix  tables. The former Soviet Union accounts  for more than two-
thirds of total world subsidies. This is to be expected  given  that domestic  prices are low relative  to world
prices, and  the fact that the Soviet Union accounts for  approximately 20% of  world fossil fuel
consumption. Estimates  of subsidies  in the Soviet  Union are highly  uncertain. Although  there is general
agreement  that substantial  subsidies  prevail, it is not clear what exchange  rate should be used to convert
figures to US dollars for the sake of comparison with world prices.  Domestic prices for the former
Soviet Union are from January 1992, and the exchange  rate used is the commercial  rate as of January
1992 - Rb 55  per US dollar.  The commercial rate is the rate used for most international  trade
transactions  and is therefore appropriate  for this case. It could  be argued  that the ruble is still overvalued
at the commercial  rate.  However, using an exchange  rate of greater than 55 rubles per US dollar will
not significantly  affect total estimated  subsidies. 5
China follows with the second highest  level of energy  subsidies. Coal subsidies  in China were
significantly  higher a few years ago (Bates and Moore, 1992) before the introduction  of the two-tier
pricing system, which permits a large proportion  of coal to be traded at market prices.  Subsidies  on
petroleum products are considered larger than those on coal (Haugland  and Roland, 1990).  Poland
follows  closely  behind with substantial  subsidies  on coal. However,  petroleum  products in Poland do not
receive  any significant  subsidies  and gasoline is taxed.
Worldwide, petroleum products are the fuel most heavily subsidized,  accounting  for more than
55% of total world subsidies, followed by coal (23%) and natural gas (21%).  Among petroleum
products, fuel oils receive  the largest subsidies  in dollar value. Gasoline  is often taxed even in countries
where there are substantial  subsidies  on other petroleum  products. For petroleum  products, the ratio of
domestic to border prices is based on subsidized  products only and excludes  taxed petroleum  products
(see Chart 1).  Thus the low domestic price to border price ratio for India reflects low domestic  prices
of kerosene and LPG, although other petroleum products are taxed.  In the case of Brazil, gasoline is
substantially  taxed, but other products are subsidizce. Venezuela  has
s For illustration, suppose world price is $ 1.  At 55 Rb/US$, price in the former Soviet Union is
less than $ 0.1 and unit subsidy is more than $ 0.9.  At 110 Rb/US$ price is less than $ 0.05 and unit
subsidy more than $ 0.95.  Thus by doubling the exchange rate total subsidies would only change by
5.5%.Table 2.  Total  Subsidies  (mUlions  U.S.S)
No wodd  price effect:  Wodd price  effect
Subsidies  Subsidies
Coal  Gas  PAuleum  ToWl  Coal  Gas  Petmleum  TOtal
Former USSR  33415  44783  94250  172449  30312  33310  87902  151523
China  3389  378  10300  14067  1618  378  9033  11029
Poland  7868  980  620  9468  6928  513  496  7937
Czechoslvakia  3500  350  3850  3082  321  3403
Brazil  3700  3700  1196  3196
Venezuela  3500  3500  ,227  3227
Mexico  3000  3000  2583  2583
India  906  1675  2581  365  1473  1838
Indonesia  2500  2500  2174  2174
lKA  Saudi Anbia  2200  2200  1848  1848
Argentins  400  1600  2000  400  1403  1803
South Africa  1932  1932  1609  1609
Egypt  800  800  698  698
Subtoul  51011  46541  124495  222047  43915  34601  114353  192868
Subsidies  - Nonsample  8000  800 countries
Total  230000  201000
Source: Authors'  calculations.Chart  1  Ratio of Domestic  Prices  to World Prices
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* For  developing  countries,  selected  petroleum  products  are mainly  fuel oils,
gasolnel  soften  taxed  and In  those  cases  not Include3. For industral
countries,  however,  all petroleum  products  wre  include  F  d
Petroleum  Products:
ALL  -Welshted  Avg.  of all petroleum  products
F  Fuel90ils
K  -Kerosene
Uquified  petroleum  gas I  asoline
D  - utomothe  diesel
Source:  Authors'  calculations.substantial subsidies  on all petroleun products.  Gasoline  prices in Mexico  and Indonesia  are close to
border prices, but substantial  subsidies  exist on other petroleum  products. Saudi Arabia  taxes heavy fuel
oil (light  fuel  oil prices are close  to border prices), but has high subsidies  on all other petroleum  products.
Czechoslovakia  subsidizes  only light fuel oils (besides  coal) and gasoline  prices are 2.8 times higher  than
border prices.
Calculations presented in  Table 2  place the level of  total  world fossil fuel subsidies at
approximately  US $230  billion, which corresponds  to 20-25%  of world  fossil fuel consumption  at current
world prices.
m. Implications  for Mgeenhouse  gas emiss^-ns
Removal  of fossil fuel subsidies  will presumably  induce  reductions  in fossil fuel consumption  and
therefore carbon emissions in subsidizing countries.  Conversely, consumption in non-subsidizing
countries  could increase if reductions in fossil fuel demand in subsidizing  countries  lower world prices.
Furthermore, if domestic prices are below world prices because  of price ceilings that are effective for
producers as well as consumers,  then removing  such ceilings  may have positive  supply effects  that could
further reduce world prices. On the other hand, because  removing  producer  subsidies  will tend to reduce
supply, we assume that the combined  effect of removing  of producer ceilings and subsidies is to leave
supply unchanged  - as far as subsidies  are concerned, we therefore ignore  the supply side in subsidizing
countries. The extent  to which reduced  demand  in subsidizing  countries  impacts  on world  prices and thus
on increased  demand in non-subsidizing  countries  can be expected  to differ for each fossil fuel.
The first part of this section estimates  carbon reductions  assuming no change in world prices.
The last part estimates  world price effects and their impact  on demand  for each fossil fuel in subsidizing
and non-subsidizing  countries.
11.1. No world price effects
The magnitude  of carbon reductions  that result from the removal of fossil fuel subsidies  clearly
depends on the relevant price elasticities  of demand.  Bohi (1981) presents a comprehensive  survey of
price elasticities  of energy  demand. Long run elasticities  are in the range of -0.5 to -1.0  for natural gas,
-0.7 to -1.5 for petroleum products, -0.5 to -1.0 for coal, and -0.5 to -1.0 for electricity. In a cross
sectional study of OECD countries, Hoeller and Wallin (1991) estimate  the long-run price elasticity of
carbon demand at -1.04.  These elasticity estimates are only valid for marginal price changes.  In
countries where subsidies are high, such as the former Soviet Union, elasticity  estimates for marginalprice changes  cannot  be used to estimate  emissionreductions. Instead,  much smaller  elasticities  must be
considered. The elasticities  used in most of the cases considered  here range from -0.15 to -0.25, and to -
0.6 where subsidy levels are low (see tables in appendix).
The analysis  ignores interfiiel  substitution. For the former Soviet  Union, where fossil fuels are
subsidized across the board in  almost the same proportion, this  is an unproblematic assumption.
However, in other countries (accounting  for some 30% of carbon emissions  reductions),  to the extent a
potential  for interfuel  substitution  exists, the estimates  of emission  reductions  presented  here may be too
high.  Estimates  of emission  reductions resulting from the removal of subsidies can also be in serious
error for countries  where supply exceeds  demand  at low prices and is therefore completely  inelastic  - as
may be the case for natural gas in particular. In Argentina, China, and Poland, demand  for natural gas
is considered  to be cons#.rained  by supply. Within a certain range, therefore, an increase in natural gas
prices may not have any significant  effect on natural gas consumption. Factoring  out emission  reductions
resulting  from natural gas price increases  in these three countries  would have only a minor effect on the
overall estimate  for global carbon emissions  reductions. Since, in the case of the former Soviet Union,
the share of natural gas in total energy consumption  is as large as that of petroleum  products and coal,
it  is  not unrealistic to  assume that  natural gas price increases will lead to  reduced natural gas
consumption.
We assume  a constant  own  price elasticity  of demand, -e (e > 0), with an inverse  demand  function,
p(q).  = c q-"'  (2)
where q is consumption  of fossil fuel, p is the domestic unit price of q, and c is a constant determined
by the initial equilibrium.'  If (p,, q,) is the initial equilibrium  at subsidized  prices, p,, and (p,, qj) is
the equilibrium  that would prevail if domestic prices were raised to world prices, p,,  the percentage
reduction in fossil fuel consumption  that results from raising prices from p, to p, is,
(q, - q.)/q,  =  1 - (P,/p)'  (3)
6 Equation (2) is derived from the differential  equation  that defines elasticity,
(pIqJ(8q/Ip)  =  -e
aEstimates  of carbon emission  roductions  resulting  from subsidy  removal  are presented  by country
in Table 3, and by country and fuel in the appendix. Subsidy  removal could result in a 9% reduction
in world carbon emissions. In terms  of potential  national  carbon  emissions  reductions,  the former Soviet
Union is ranked  first with 33% reductions,  followed  by China  and Poland. Although  emission  reductions
of 33% may appear unrealistically  high, even after such reductions  carbon intensity  in the former Soviet
Union would still be significantly  higher than in other middle income  countries  or the OECD. 7
111.2.  World price effects
Large reductions in fossil fuel demand in subsidizing  countries may have significant  effects  on
world or regional prices and therefore  on demand in non-subsidizing  countries. We consider  only those
world price effects  that arise from changes  in fossil fuel  demand  caused  by removing  subsidies. Although
changes  in the relative  prices of other goods  may affect consumption  patters, this is ignored  -even  though
such changes may to some extent affect fossil fuel consumption  since fossil fuels are inputs in their
production.  We assume world prices, p, are determined  by supply and demand in the long run, and
define linear world demand and supply functions,
qD  =aD  - bDp
(4)
u,s =ea  +  bsp
where  qu =  qDI  +  qD 2, with qD 1 and qD 2 linear demand functions  for subsidizing  and non-subsidizing
countries respectively,  and similarly  for qs.
Price equilibrium in the market is,
p  =  (aD  - a8)/(b  +  bV)  (5)
corresponding  to p in Figure 1.  Emission reductions resulting from subsidy removal (but estimated
without  taking account of world price effects)  correspond  to a movement  from a to b in Figure 1.  This
movement  is equivalent  to an inward shift in the world demand  curve in Figure 2, here noted as a change
in aD.
Thus OaD  is tons of reduction  of carbon or fossil fuel consumption  assuming  no world price
7  Carbon intensity is defined as the ratio of tons of carbon emitted per dollar of GDP.
2Table 3  Emission Reductions
No world  price effect:  World  price effect:
emission  %  emission  %
reduetion  reduetior  mdugtion  reduction
Pormer USSR  330688  33%  318062  31%
China  62814  11%  40063  7%
Poland  25111  20%  23171  18%
India  10779  7%  5191  4%
South  Africa  IOS96  14%  9426  12%
Czechoslovakia  10348  16%  9585  IS%
Mexico  S538  7%  4701  6%
Brazil  4160  8%  3613  7%
Argentina  3728  13%  3491  12%
Venezuela  3621  IS%  3508  14%
Indonesia  3189  12%  2911  11%
Saudi Arabia  2910  7%  23SI  S%
Egypt  2032  11%  1809  9%
Total  47S51S  427982
8.7%  7.8%
Emissions  reductions  from  22000  22000
non-sample  countries
Grand total  497SIS  449982
9.0%  8.2%
Non-subsidizing  countries  -186014
Net  emission  reductions  263968
4.9%
Source: Authorm'  calculations.
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World  price  alttc:  a  to  Ceffects.  Differentiating  (5) with respect to aD  gives,
aplaa  =  1/  (bs +  bD)
which in elasticity form is,
(q/p)ap/aaD  =  (q/p) / (bS  +  bD)  =  1  (eS +  el)  =  I  (eP +  elD[q 1/ql +  epD[q 2/ql)
or
aplp  =  {1 / (e  + e, [q,/ql +  e2Djq 2/qI))aa, /q  (6)
where e,D and e2D  are absolute values of own price elasticities  of demand for subsidizing and non-
subsidizing  countries  respectively,  and el is weighted  average  own price supply  elasticity  for subsidizing
and non-subsidizing  countries.
The increase in consumption  of each fossil fuel resulting from the reduction in world
prices is given by,
aq, =  qi e,D  aplp  (7)
for country i.  The net aggregate  effect on consumption  (i.e., the decrease in consumption  resulting  from
subsidy  removal plus the increase resulting  from reduced world prices) is,
aq = aaD  + E; aOq;  (8)
with aaD <  0, represented in Figure 2 as the movement  from a to c.  The following  sections  apply this
framework  to the markets for oil/petroleum  products, natural gas, and coal.
Oil/petroleum  products: Two assumptions  are made  here: first, that there is a perfectly  integrated
world market  for oil/petroleum  products in which  prices are determined  by supply  and demand  in the long
run; second, that a percentage  change in the price of crude oil translates into an equivalent  percentage
change in the prices for refined products.
Assuming  a weighted average supply elasticity of 0.5 and a demand elasticity of 0.8 in non-
subsidizing  countries, world prices of petroleum products (6) are estimated to fall 6.4%.  Demand
elasticity in subsidizing countries are as assumed in section 111.1.  Increases in petroleum product
consumption,  and hence carbon emissions, resulting  from lower world prices are estimated  by equation
12(7) and presented in Table 3 for each of the subsidizing  countties: estimates for the non-subsidizing
countries are given in Table A3, in aggregate terms and by fuel.  Net emission reductions in the
subsidizing countries make up as much as 95% of total reductions when no world price effects are
assumed. Emission increases in non-subsidizing  countries amount to more than 50% of reductions  in
subsidizing countries.  Net  world emission reductions are  3.3%  when world  price  effects are
incorporated,  compared  to 7. 1  % when world price effects are ignored.
Natural  gas:  The natural gas market is more regional in nature than the oil market.  For the
purposes  of this paper, we distinguish  the following  natural gas markets:
* The United  States, Canada and Mexico;
* Western and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Algeria;
* Rest of the world.
Tne first two markets  account for more than 80% of production, consumption  and trade.  Furthermore,
almost all trade is intra-market. We  therefore assume  that general equilibrium  price effects  will not affect
prices in other regional  markets. World  subsidies  on natural gas are primarily  in the former Soviet  Union
and therefore our analysis  will be confined  to relevant  European  market  only. Large reductions  in natural
gas demand in subsidizing  countries may have significant effects on gas prices and consequently  on
demand in the corresponding  regional gas market.  We assume that regional prices are determined by
supply and demand in the long run.  We further assume that a percentage  change in the price of natural
gas translates into an equivalent  percentage  change in gas prices in all sectors of consumption.
Assuming a weighted average supply elasticity of 0.5 and a demand elasticity of 0.8 for non-
subsidizing  countries, regional prices are estimated  to fall by almost 24%.  Again, demand elasticities
for subsidizing  countries  are the same as in section  Il1.  1. Similarly,  increases  in natural  gas consumption,
and thus carbon emissions, due to the reduction in regional prices are derived using equation (7) and
presented in Table 3 for each of the subsidizing  countries, and for the non-subsidizing  countries in Table
A2, in aggregate terms and by fuel.  Net emission reductions in the subsidizing  countries are still
substantial  - as much as 92% of total reductions,  assuming  no regional price effects. Emission  increases
in non-subsidizing  countries are about 25% of the reductions in subsidizing countries.  Net world
emission  reductions  are 7.5%, compared  to 11.6% in partial equilibrium.Coal:  World coal markets are not as  integrated as world oil markets, in part because of
significant  domestic protection in the form of producer subsidies and trade barriers.  World coal trade
is only 10% of world  production, but is intercontinental. The United  States and Australia  are the largest
exporters, followed  by South Africa, Canada, Poland and the former Soviet Union.  The largest import
markets are Western Europe and Japan.  Subsidy removal can be expected to  have some general
equilibrium  price effects, but the corresponding  demand  effects, although  difficult  to quantify, are muted
by protectionism. Consequently,  although  we estimate  general equilibrium  effects under the assumption
of a fully integrated  world coal market with no domestic  protection, we keep in mind that the increase
in world demand  that results from a decline in world coal prices may be reduced  by domestic  protection.
Assuming a weighted average supply elasticity of 0.5 and a demand elasticity of 0.8 in non-
subsidizing  countries, equation (6) implies a 8.4% fall in coal prices.  Again, the demand elasticity in
the subsidizing countries is the same as in section 111.1. Increases in coal consumption,  or  carbon
emissions, due to the fall in world coal prices are estimated  by equation  (7) and presented  in Table 3 for
each of the subsidizing  countries, and for the non-subsidizing  countries  in Table Al,  in aggregate  terms
and by fuel.  Net emission  reductions in the subsidizing  countries  are almost 85% of total reductions,
assuming no world price effects, and emission  increases in non-subsidizing  countries  are about 36% of
reductions  in subsidizing  countries. Thus, net world emission  reductions  are 4.3% if world price effects
are incorporated,  compared  to 9.0% if world price effects are ignored.
The aggregate  effect of changes  in all three markets  would be to reduce emissions  in subsidizing
countries by 8.7%, assuming unchanged  world prices.  Accounting  for reductions in world prices, and
thus increased  consumption  and emissions  in non-subsidizing  countries,  global emission  reductions  would
be 4.5%.  Additional  emission  reductions  in non-sample  countries  accounting  for 15% of global carbon
emissions, and enission reductions in sample countries  for which data were not available, may lead to
total emission reductions of around 9%, given unchanged  world prices, and 5% of world emissions,
accounting  for world price changes.
IV.  Welfare costs of fossil fuel subsidies.
In the long-run, removing fossil fuel subsidies will improve welfare, assuming no changes in
world prices. If subsidies  are removed  and world prices do fall, the welfare  of fossil fuel exporters  may
decline. The model used here to estimate  welfare effects is limited  to changes  in the fossil fuel markets
and ignores effects from potential changes  in the relative  prices of other goods. Changes in welfare are
14first estimated  on the assumption  of constant  world prices.  (If only a single "small  country" eliminated
subsidies,  this assumption  would  be realistic). Welfare  effects  are then estimated  for subsidizing  and non-
subsidizing  countries  taking into account the impacts  on world prices estimated in the previous section.
Welfare calculations are based on consumer and producer surpluses of fossil fuel consumption and
production,  an approach  which assumes  full employment  of resources, and should  therefore be considered
a long-run approximation. Demand and supply elasticities  are as presented earlier.
Case 1. No change in world prices:
Welfare measured as the sum of consumer  and producer surplus at subsidized  fossil fuel prices
(p) is,
Wp=f 'D8q-tfXS8x+pw(xl-q1)  (9)
where D is the inverse  demand function, S is the inverse  supply function, q; is domestic consumption  at
subsidized  price p, x, is domestic  production  at price p, and ps,,  is world price. Welfare  at non-subsidized
world price (pw)  is,
Wv=f| D8q-f  fS8x+p  (x -q )  (10)
where q,  is domestic consumption  and x,, is domestic production  at world price p,.  Thus change in
welfare from subsidy  removal is,
AW=W4'  -W  =-f" 'D8q+p.(q  -q)-X-S8x+p(x-x)>O  (11)
This welfare effect is illustrated  in Figure 3 for fossil fuel exporters  and importers,  with dhe  shaded area
(+) representing welfare gain.  Approximating  AW by assuming  linear demand and supply  functions  in
the relevant range gives,aW  O.5(q 1 - q.)(p.  - p) +  O.5(x.  - x,)(p. - p)
or
AW = O.51(q 1 - q.)/ql}{(p. - p)ql) + O.5((x.  - xi)/x,}(p.  - p)x,}  (12)
where  the first factor in the first term is percentage  change  in consumption  from subsidy  removal,  the
second  factor  in the first term is total subsidies,  the first  factor  in the second  term is percentage  change
in production  from subsidy  removal. The latter is non-zero  if domestic  prices  are below  world  prices
due  either  to price  ceilings  and/or  to producer  subsidies.  We  assume  that  the last term is zero  - i.e. that
subsidy  removal  engenders  no supply  response  in a subsidizing  country.
Total  welfare  gains  in subsidizing  countries  from removing  fossil  fuel subsidies  are more  than
US $33  billion  (some  15%  of world  subsidies). Welfare  gains  are largest  for the former  Soviet  Union
at approximately  US$  29 billion  (Table  4), a figure  which  amounts  to 17%  of its total  subsidies  and  88%
of world welfare  gains.  China  and Poland  follow  with the second  and third largest  welfare  gains.
Welfare  gains  by fuel are largest  for petroleum  products  (59%  of total) as a result of the enormous
petroleum  subsidies  in the former  Soviet  Union.
Case n. Change  in world  prices:
We  assume  that  all subsidizing  countries  remove  subsidies  in the  same  time  period. Thus  welfare
at subsidized  prices  (p) is as given  by equation  (9)  since  there  is  no change  in world  prices  before  subsidy
removal. When  subsidies  are removed  world  prices  fall from  pw,  to p.  and  domestic  prices  are  adjusted
to p..  Welfare  at non-subsidized  prices  p,  is,
wp  ,=-f 0 wD8q-|f 0 -s8x+p.(x,-q.,)  (13)
where  q9,.  is domestic  consumption  and x.  is production  Pt new  world  prices  pw.  Change  in welfare
from subsidy  removal  is by linear  approximation  of D and  S,
AW =  WO( - Wp
0 .5{(q, - q.,)/qJ}{(p., - p)q,} + 0.5{(x.. - x,)/x,}{(p.. - p)x,) + (p.- - p.)(xI - ql)  (14)Ll
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No wodd price effect:  Wodd price effsct:
Welp  in So  Welfrt  sdnz
(mil USS)  (mi  USS
Formot  USSR  29302  22195
chim  1063  471
Pobnd  944  891
IndbI  74  206
South  Afuica  154  6
Czeohoulovakia  381  454
Mexico  143  -3S2
Drel  201  464
Ariodna  132  137
Venzuela  508  -155
Ioneia  194  .223
Saudi Arabia  100  -1446
Egypt  51  -167
Total  33250  22483
Wesen Burope  7010
United  Staws  3975
Japan  251S
Soumce:  Authors'  calcuatios.
The two first terms are similar to those in case 1, but with new world prices and corresponding  quantities
of consumption  and production. The last  term represents  an exporting  country's welfare loss from lower
world prices, or an importer's welfare gain from lower prices.  Welfare gains (+)  and losses (-) are
illustrated  by shaded area in Figure 4, for both exporters  and importers. Welfare  gains or losses  resulting
from the import  or export effects  of changed  world fossil  fuel prices are based on border prices for crude
oil, natural gas, and coal, and not on end-user prices.  If a country produces no fossil fuels, then the
second term is zero and q, = 0.
In this case, welfare gains for the former Soviet Union are reduced to US$22 billion, but are
increased  for fossil fuel importers such as India, Brazil, and Czechoslovakia. Exporters  such as Saudi
Arabia, Mexico, Indonesia, Venezuela, and Egypt experience a net welfare loss due to lower export
prices. Note, however, that because  the fall in world prices is not induced  by the subsidy  removal in anyFigure 4  Welfare Effect of Subsidy Removal
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Y.,  Xw,  qw'  q1one of these countries alone, welfare losses would be even larger if subsidies  were not removed.
Reduced  world  prices  for fossil fuels do not leave welfare in non-subsidizing  countries  unaffected.
Welfare change by linear approximation  of D and S is,
AW =  Ww. - Wm  =  0.5(qw. - qw,)(pw  - pw.) +  0.5(xW - xw.)(p, - p,.) +  (p,* - p*)(xw  - qw,)  (15)
or
AW = Wp.. - Wp. =  0.5ej(8pw/p.Yq,p,  + O.5es(Op./p.) 2xwp. + (p,. - p,)(x. - q.)  (16)
where e's are the absolute  values of demand and supply elasticities. Since  they all are net importers of
fossil fuels, Western Europe, the United  States, and Japan would  see their welfare increase  by more than
US$13 billion.
These calculations assume full employment  of resources.  In fact, subsidy removal may have
significant  short-run adjustment  costs.  It may not therefore be politically  acceptable  over a short time
horizon  unless some external inducement  for subsidy removal is provided  to subsidizing  countries. This
issue is considered in the next section.
V. Potential  foreign  inducement  for rem-oval  of subsidies:
Suppose OECD countries decide to reduce carbon emissions from fossil fuel consumption  by
some percentage  below current levels. This may be achieved  in several ways, one of which is to impose
a carbon tax in the OECD countries.  An alternative is to achieve equivalent reductions by paying
countries that subsidize fossil fuels to remove such subsidies.  While removing such subsidies would
improve welfare  in  the  long-run, there  might be  short  run  adjustment costs and  distributional
consequences;  without  compensation  subsidy  removal  is unlikely  to politically  acceptable. It is, therefore,
of some interest to determine: first, the level of OECD carbon taxes needed to  achieve emission
reductions equivalent  to those achieved  by subsidy removal; and second, OECD willingness  to  "buy"
equivalent  reductions  from subsidizing  countries.
Estimated  carbon  emission  reductions  from subsidy  removal  are lowered  if world  price constancy
is not assumed.  Similarly, if OECD countries unilaterally reduce carbon emissions we may expect
emission  increases  In non-OECD  countries  in response  to reduced  world prices. Furthermore,  the effect
on carbon emissions  per dollar of carbon tax in any one OECD country will be decreased if such a tax
is also imposed  in all OECD countries, since world prices may fall.  The net global effect of anOECD carbon tak on carbon emissions from fuel use is,
aq =  (es  / (eS  +  e,D[q,/qJ  + e2 ,[q 2/q]))}aD  (18)
derived from (4) and (5), with
aaD  = 8q2  =  (1 - (p/p)')q 2 (19)
where p and pt are weighted average fossil fuel prices in OECD countries before and after carbon tax
respectively,  and e is price elasticity  of demand  (e2D)  as in equation  (3). Table 5 presents  a range  of three
cases in which price elasticity  of fossil fuel demand in OECD countries  varies from 0.6, through 0.8, to
1.0; supply elasticities  for all countries  and demand elasticities  for all non-OECD  countries  are the same
as in section HI.  Using equation (8), and thus accounting  for world price effects, world emission
reductions from subsidy removal are estimated for each of the demand elasticities  of non-subsidizing
(primar^!y  OECD) countries. Next, a carbon tax is estimated  that provides a value for p/p, in (19) such
that the value of aq in (18) is equal to world emission  reductions  resulting from subsidy removal.  A
range for aq is presented in Table 5.  The lower bound  assumes  a demand  effect in non-OECD  countries
from lower world prices, which would be the case if lower world  prices were to translate  into lower end-
user prices.  The upper bound assumes no demand effect in non-OECD  countries, which would be the
case if prices were fixed in subsidizing  countries: lower world prices would not translate  via the market
to  lower end-user prices, and there would be no demand effect in those countries.  To achieve as
substantial  a reduction in emissions  worldwide  as subsidy  removal, a carbon tax would need to be in the
range of US $50-$90 (see Table 5).  Total emission reductions in OECD countries are about 20%
assuming  no world price effects. Nordhaus  (1991), using a survey  of cost estimates  of carbon  reductions
in several countries and regions, derives a marginal  cost curve according  to which a US $60 carbon tax
would  reduce emissions  by 20%. A demand  elasticity  of 0.8 is therefore  quite consistent  with Nordhaus'
marginal  cost curve.
Estimations  presented in Table 5 suggest that a substantial  carbon tax is necessary to reduce
emissions by  the same amount as subsidy removal.  But, subsidy removal may not be  politically
acceptable  in the short run without some form of external compensation  for adjustment  costs.  OECD
countries might therefore consider  such compensation  a lower cost strategy for reducing emissions  than
the relatively high carbon tax estimated in this section.
21Table S  Carbon Tax in OECD Countries
Elasticity  of danad  in OECD  0.6  0.8  1.0
World emission  reduction  IS.%  5.0%  4.5%
fiom subsidy  removal
OECD Caubon  tax
(USS/ton)  for equivalent  90  65  S0
world emision reducton
accounting  for world price
effect
World  emision roduclions  4.4-5.6%  4.2-5.2%  3.9-4.7%
from OECD carbon tax
ncoting  for world  price
offet
OECD reductions  assuming  19%  20%  20%
no  world price  effecs
Source: Authors' ctimations.
VI. Summary and conclusions
Substantial  fossil fuel subsidies prevail in a handful of large carbon emitting countries. Total
world subsidies  are estimated  to be in excess  of US $230 billion, or 20-25%  of the value of world fossil
fuel consumption  at world prices.  Removing  such subsidies  would substantially  reduce national  carbon
emissions in some countries and reduce global carbon emissions by 9%, assuming no change in world
prices, and by 5%,  accounting for changes in world prices.  Welfare gains from subsidy removal
worldwide would be more than US $33 billion assuming no change in world prices, or  15% of total
subsidies, even ignoring  the benefits from curtailment  of greenhouse  gases emissions  and abatement  of
local pollution.  Welfare gains when accounting  for world price changes  would still be some US $22
billion in subsidizing  countries.  Net fossil fuel importers in Western Europe, United States and Japan
would experience a welfare gain of approximately US $14 billion in the event of subsidy removal
dampening world energy prices.  Equivalent reductions in carbon emissions could be achieved by an
OECD carbon  tax on the order of US $50-90  per ton.  It should be noted  that neither the subsidy  removal
nor an equivalent  carbon tax would be sufficient  to stabilize  global carbon  emissions  at 1990  levels.  To
22achieve  that  objective, stronger economic  policy responses  would be required.
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25APPENDIX  A
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY  EFFICIENCY  SCENARIOS AND  REDUCTIONS IN  CARBON
EMISSIONS
It  is instructive to note the potential for reductions in global carbon emissions under three
alternative  standards  of energy  efficiency:  the Japanese,  the German,  and the American  standards. Table
A presents statistics on carbon emissions  per dollar of GDP or PENN GDP. 8 Note that the rankings of
the three countries remain unchanged  under the different measures  of GDP, but the U.S. fairs poorly
compared to the world average in terms of energy efficiency on account of the GDP measure adjusted
for purchasing power parity.  If the world were to adopt Japanese or German standards of energy
efficiency, remarkably  large reductions  in global carbon emissions could  be achieved.
However, given the significance  of the composition  of fossil fuel use, a note of caution is in
order.  For example, if Japan, the USA and Germany  are below the world average in terms of (i) the
ratio of coal emissions to total emissions, and (ii) the ratio of petroleum emissions  to total emissions,
global carbon emission reductions will not be as high as stated in Table A.  This is because  coal and
petroleum  products have a higher carbon content per unit of energy  than natural gas.  This concern may
not be relevant in the case of West Germany  and the USA because  their fossil fuel composition  is about
the same as the world average.  However, in the case of Japan, which has a lower coal use than the
world average, the potential  for emission  reductions  is to some extent overstated. It is also worth noting
that to achieve German  or Japanese  standards of energy efficiency,  developing  countries  would have to
raise the relative prices of fossil fuels to similar levels - possibly through energy or carbon taxation.
Such a change in relative prices would have to be carefully  evaluated  on a country by country basis.
'PENN GDP is GDP adjusted  to purchasing  power parity (Summers  and Heston 1991).
26Table A
Global Carbon Emission Reductions from Fossil Fuel Combustion
Under Alternate Energy Efficiency Scenarios
1987
Carbon Efficiency:
C02/GDP  *  C02/Penn GDP **
(kg/USS)  (Kg/USS)
Japan  0.10  0.16
West Germany  0.16  0.17
United States  0.28  0.28
World  0.31  0.27
(weighted average)
Global carbon emission reductions if all
countries in  the  world had carbon  emissions
per dollar of GDP similar to:
Japan  West Germany  United States
Under UN National Accounts GDP  68%  48%  10%
Under PENN (PPP adjusted) GDP  41%  37%  0.4% ***
Notes:
*  UN National Accounts GDP
**  UN National Accounts GDP adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity
***  Increase
Source:  Authors' Calculations
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28Table Al.  Carbon  Emission Reductions from Removing Subsidies on Fossil Fuels  The Case of Coal
No world  price effect:  World  PriCC  effect:
dometic  domestic  erission  emission  net  emission
consumnption  prce  own  emission  reductions  increase  emission  reduction
1997  million  to border  price  reductions  to  toal  firm rllt  reductions  to total
metric  tons  orice  elasticity  (000  )  emissions  in  wodd ice  1  n  emissions
China  1112  0.84  (1989)'  0.60  47577  10%  21638  25939  5%
Former  USSR  884  0.10  (1992)  0.15  1OU40  29%  3296  105144  28%
Poland  281  0.30  (1990)  0.20  23240  2t%  1427  21813  20%
India  232  0.86  (1991)'  0.60  9387  9%  4971  4416  4%
Germuny,  East  n.a.  n.a.
South  Africa  161  0.50  (1991)  0.25  10596  16%  1170  9426  14%
Czecboslovakia  150  0.30  (1990)  0.20  9887  21%  607  9280  20%
Norlh  Kore  66  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Total  2886  209127  33110  176017
Non-sul'sidizen  2699  0.8  75755  -75755
Word  5585  209127  108865  100262
Reductions  as  %  of wodd  emissions  9.0%  4.3%
Source:  Authow'  calculations.Table  A2.  Carbon  Emission Reductions from Removing Subsidies on Fossil Fuels.  The Case of Natural Gas
No regional  price effect:  Regional  price effect
domestic  domestic  emission  emission  nut  emission consumption  price  own  emission  reductions  increasc  emission  reductions
1987  to border  price  reductions  to total  frm  fill  in  reductions  to tot (billion cu m)  price  elasticity  (000  emissions  renional oricc  (000 nt)  emissions
Fonemr  USSR  636  0.07 (1992)  0.15  99470  33%  7253  92217  30%
Ronania  39  n.a.  U.S.  n.
Mexico  24  naa.  n.a.  n.a.
Saudi Arabia  26  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Venezuea  18  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Argentina  17  0.50 (1989)  0.25  1591  16  1591  16%
Algeria  17
Iran  15  na.  na..  n.
China  14  0.40 (1986)  0.20  1222  17%  1222  17%
United Arab  Emirates  14
Poland  13  0.50 (1990)  0.25  87S  16%  276  600  11%
TOal  833  1031S8  7528  95630
Non-subsidizes  317  0.8  28917  -28917
World  1867  103158  36446  66713
Reductions  as % of world emissions  11.6%  75%
Source: Authors'  calculations.Table A3. Carbon Eniission  Reductions  from Removing  Subsidies  on Fossil  Fuels: The Case of Petroleum  Products (subsidized  products only)
No wodd  price effect:  Word price ence
dometic  domestic  emission  emision  net  emission consumption  price  own  emission  reductions  increae  emission  reductions 1987  to border  pice  reductons  to total  from  fal in  redwtion  to totl (million  tonr)  ce  elasticit  000  mt)  emissons  word  (000  Olemt
Foimer  USSR  448  0.05  (1992)  0.15  122778  36%  2077  120701  35%
Chlins  103  0.48  (198S)  0.25  14015  17%  1113  12902  15%
Mexico  76  0.54  (1990)  0.25  5538  10%  838  4701  8%
Brazil  63  0.53  (1990)  0.25  4160  11%  546  3613  9%
India  49  0.47  (1990)  0.25  1391  4%  517  874  2%
Saudi  Arbia  44  0.60  (1990)  0.30  2910  9%  SS8  23S1  7%
11aj1  43  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Indona  25  0.5O  (1990)  0.25  3189  15%  278  2911  14%
Argentina  24  0.48 (1990)  0.25  2137  13%  X8  1900  11%
Egypt  22  050  (1992)  0.2S  2032  13%  223  1809  11%
Romania  17  na..  na.  na.
Germnay,  East  17  Da.  na..  na..
Czechosovakia  16  0.22 (1990)  0.20  461  4%  15S  306  2%
Venzuel  20  0.18 (1990)  0.20  36il  29%  113  3508  28%
Bulgaria  14  na..  n..  n.e.
PolAnd  17  0.68 (1990)  0.35  996  9%  237  759  6%
Total  998  163229  6894  15633S
Non-bsidizers  2142  0.8  81341
WorM  3140  163229  88236  74994
Reductios a  % of wodd  emaink  7.1%  3.27%
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